New Delhi: BharatNet began with a clear promise: to bring broadband connectivity to India’s gram panchayats and bridge the country’s digital divide. More than a decade later, the government has built much of the network, but internet services still lag far behind the infrastructure laid on the ground.
The Comptroller and Auditor General’s performance audit, tabled in Parliament on August 12, 2026, found that the government had covered 96.70 per cent of targeted gram panchayats with BharatNet infrastructure by November 2025. Yet only 33.20 per cent of service-ready gram panchayats were actually operational. The audit also flagged persistent downtime, slow fault resolution, low network utilisation and weak revenue generation.
The numbers point to a simple but important distinction: building the network and making the network work are not the same thing. The Union Cabinet approved BharatNet in October 2011 under its original name, the National Optical Fibre Network, to link every gram panchayat in the country to broadband. The government renamed the project BharatNet in 2016 and has executed it through Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL), a special purpose vehicle incorporated in 2012.
The Cabinet later approved BBNL’s merger with state-run BSNL in July 2022, and in August 2023 it approved the Amended BharatNet Programme (ABP), naming BSNL as the project’s management agency, as the CAG’s Audit Report No. 19 of 2026 records.
By November 2025, the government had spent ₹39,888 crore against an approved outlay of ₹42,068 crore and had covered 96.70 per cent of the targeted gram panchayats with fibre infrastructure. On paper, that number reads like near-total success. But the audit draws a sharp line between infrastructure and service: only 33.2 per cent of service-ready gram panchayats were operational.
In other words, the government has taken fibre to most of the places it intended to reach, but a large majority of those locations still do not have a functioning BharatNet broadband service. The CAG stated its conclusion plainly: BharatNet has achieved substantial infrastructural success but has fallen short of its broader objective of bridging the digital divide.
The Cost of Delay
BharatNet missed its original 2016 completion target and has continued to slip timelines since. The CAG’s audit ties that delay directly to the programme’s stated purpose, finding that the delayed rollout deferred the availability of broadband connectivity in rural areas meant to enable access to education, healthcare, business, entertainment and e-governance.
That matters because the delay was not simply about a project missing a deadline.BharatNet aimed to build digital infrastructure for rural India.
Every year of delay also meant delayed access to the services and opportunities that reliable broadband can provide. The audit therefore links the implementation delays to the programme’s larger objective of early socio-economic transformation in rural areas.
The Connectivity Gap
Auditors found that the network lacked integrated fibre fault localisation systems, making maintenance more difficult. When a fibre cable is damaged or cut, technicians must first locate the fault before they can begin repairs.
The problem is reflected in the network’s downtime figures. Fibre faults or cuts accounted for around 48 per cent of non-operational cases. At the same time, the average Mean Time to Restore (MTTR) for fibre faults stood at around 17 days.
That means a gram panchayat can potentially remain without a working connection for more than two weeks after a fibre fault. For rural users depending on the network for online education, digital payments, government services or other internet-based activities, such delays can make an otherwise available network practically unusable.
The CAG also found that operational performance varied significantly across states. Gujarat and Punjab were the only states where more than 90 per cent of gram panchayats were operational. The national figure of 33.2 per cent therefore hides a wide difference in performance between states.
An Underused Network
The problem goes beyond whether a connection technically works. The CAG found that users utilised only 17.91 per cent of the available bandwidth. The audit also noted that key stakeholders, including major telecom service providers, withdrew from the network over service quality concerns.
This creates another gap in the BharatNet story. Even where the physical network exists, users are not utilising its capacity anywhere near its full potential. A broadband network designed to connect rural communities cannot deliver its intended impact if the infrastructure remains underused or service providers are reluctant to rely on it.
The Revenue Gap
The government designed BharatNet to eventually support its own upkeep through revenue generated from the network. The CAG found that this model has not worked as intended. High maintenance costs relative to the revenue generated by the network have weakened the project’s financial sustainability and raised concerns about its long-term viability. The audit also uncovered a specific instance involving project funds.
BSNL, operating under the Central Public Sector Undertaking-led implementation model, diverted ₹2,001.43 crore of BharatNet project funds for other purposes. The CAG noted that the amount was subsequently returned. The Amended BharatNet Programme now requires mandatory submission of Utilisation Certificates, a measure intended to strengthen monitoring of project funds and prevent similar instances in the future.
The audit also found differences between implementation models. The milestone-based payment structure performed weakest under the CPSU-led model, while private-led implementation showed stronger financial discipline and better service outcomes. The comparison raises a larger question about how BharatNet should be implemented and monitored as the government moves into its next phase.
Earlier Red Flags
The CAG’s audit did not raise these concerns in isolation. Just days before the audit report was tabled, the Standing Committee on Communications and Information Technology flagged gaps in BharatNet’s rollout and utilisation and called for a comprehensive, state-wise performance audit of the programme.
As of February 28, 2026, BharatNet Points of Presence were operational at 78,899 gram panchayats out of around 2.64 lakh across the country. The committee noted that the government had created substantial infrastructure, but the number of operational gram panchayats remained well below the goal of universal coverage. The committee also called for a revised, time-bound roadmap with clear accountability for completing connectivity across all gram panchayats.
A Vast Network, Low Usage
The scale of the infrastructure already created is considerable. By February 28, 2026, the government had laid around 7.19 lakh kilometres of optical fibre cable under BharatNet and disbursed ₹40,635 crore from the Digital Bharat Nidhi for Phase I and Phase II of the programme. Yet the network’s actual use remains far below what its scale suggests.
The government had activated 9,48,237 Fibre-to-the-Home connections nationwide by that date. The parliamentary committee described the utilisation of the infrastructure as sub-optimal compared with the network’s size and potential. This means BharatNet faces two connected problems: ensuring that the network stays operational and ensuring that people and service providers actually use it once it is available.
The Bigger Picture
Taken together, the CAG audit and the parliamentary committee’s findings point to the same underlying problem. India has built a large rural broadband network, but the physical presence of fibre has not translated into reliable, widespread broadband service.
The government has spent close to ₹40,000 crore and taken fibre infrastructure to nearly all targeted gram panchayats. Yet the CAG found that only about one-third of service-ready gram panchayats were operational as of November 2025.
Where the network fails, repairs can take an average of 17 days. Where it works, a significant share of its available bandwidth remains unused. That gap is ultimately the central issue facing BharatNet.
The Next Challenge
The Amended BharatNet Programme now faces a different challenge from the one that defined the project’s early years. The government can no longer measure progress only by the kilometres of fibre laid or the number of gram panchayats technically covered.
The bigger test is whether those networks remain operational, whether technicians can detect and repair faults quickly, whether service providers are willing to use the infrastructure, and whether rural households actually receive reliable broadband. BharatNet has made considerable progress in building the physical network.
But the CAG audit shows that infrastructure alone does not bridge a digital divide. The real measure of success will be whether the fibre laid across rural India translates into an internet connection that people can actually use — consistently, affordably, and without waiting weeks for it to come back after a fault.
